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Abstract 
The measurement of health inequalities usually involves either estimating the concentration 
of health outcomes using an income-based measure of status or applying conventional 
inequality-measurement tools to a health variable that is non-continuous or, in many cases, 
categorical. However, these approaches are problematic as they ignore less restrictive 
approaches to status. The approach in this paper is based on measuring inequality 
conditional on an individual's position in the distribution of health outcomes: this enables us 
to deal consistently with categorical data. We examine several status concepts to examine 
self-assessed health inequality using the sample of world countries contained in the World 
Health Survey. We also perform correlation and regression analysis on the determinants of 
inequality estimates assuming an arbitrary cardinalisation. Our findings indicate major 
heterogeneity in health inequality estimates depending on the status approach, 
distributional-sensitivity parameter and measure adopted. We find evidence that pure health 
inequalities vary with median health status alongside measures of government quality. 
 
Keywords: health inequality, categorical data, entropy measures, health surveys, upward 
  status, downward status 
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1. Introduction 
Measuring health inequality presents a challenge quite different from the standard 
problem of measuring income or wealth inequality. The challenge principally lies in the 
measurement of health itself: health cannot be assumed to be directly and unambiguously 
observable and it may not make sense to treat it as a continuous variable. As a consequence 
one has to use indirect methods that may involve elicitation of a person's self-assessed health 
status or explicit modelling using observables that are thought to be related to health. Such 
indirect methods can be problematic. So the purpose of this paper is to examine the main 
practical approaches to inequality measurement in the health context and the extent to which 
different assumptions about health status affect inequality comparisons. 
 
Why are indirect approaches to health measurement typically problematic? The first 
reason is because of the assumptions that have to be adopted in modelling health: if health 
status is taken as a latent variable, with what observables is it correlated?1 There is evidently 
room for several alternative answers: some research suggests that SAH correlates with 
mortality, some with hospital records (Heien 2015, Idler and Benyamini 1997). The second – 
and perhaps more fundamental – reason that such approaches are problematic is that health 
cannot be taken as a monetary-equivalent measure and that, in many health models, it should 
be treated as an ordinal or categorical variable rather than a continuous variable. That being 
so, standard methods of inequality analysis and standard properties of inequality indexes do 
not apply (Van Doorslaer and Jones 2003). So, how is one to measure inequality? 
 
This paper addresses the main theoretical and practical difficulties presented by the 
measurability problem of health-status inequality and, in doing so, examines the problems of 
working with self-assessed health (SAH) indicators, the use of alternative approaches to the 
measurement health inequality and the information content of different concepts of status. 
We compare our approach to the case of inequality analysis based on a standard but arbitrary 
cardinalisation of health using standard inequality indices. 
 
The results from this paper go towards the identification of a more appropriately based 
definition of health status and of health-inequality measures. We provide researchers with a 
simple means of testing alternative ways of measuring inequalities of non-cardinal outcomes 
that may have significant policy implications. This is particularly important when one takes 
account of the fact that measures of health inequality are used to rank health systems, and 
increasingly measures of well-being are used by the World Health Organisation and other 
government bodies to evaluate institutions and public policies. Specifically, we undertake the 
following: 
 
                                                          
1 On the correlation between SAH and objective measures of health status see Bound (1991). 
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1. We provide an alternative estimation of (pure) health inequalities using a measure 
of status that is not imposed through an arbitrary cardinalisation strategy, but based 
on two perspectives of the distribution of health status. We focus on concepts of 
status derived from the distribution of health outcomes to compute inequality 
measurements. This is an application of the cardinalisation method employed in 
the Cowell-Flachaire (2014) status-inequality approach. We compare these 
estimates to those that would emerge from simple direct cardinalisations of health 
status. 
 
2. We provide the first multi-country estimate of health inequalities using the status-
inequality approach. 
 
3. We then examine the determinants of the two different perspectives of status-
inequality (mentioned in 1 above) across countries taking into account 
determinants such as per capita income, average education demographics as well 
as a collection of indicators for political development. This allows one to examine 
a number of important questions: do poor countries exhibit higher health-inequality 
irrespective of status? Are specific demographics more likely to engender health 
inequalities? What is the role of institutional variables, and specifically measures 
of democratic development (which can explain policy sensitivity to health needs)? 
We control for cross-country fixed effects and regional consistency in inequality 
patterns. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 contains some necessary theoretical 
background, section 3 introduces the data set and explains our empirical strategy, section 4 
contains our results and section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Health-inequality measurement – principles and practice 
For a coherent approach to the measurement of health inequality we need two basic 
concepts and a methodology for measuring or estimating values of these concepts and then 
aggregating the values. 
 
2.1 Basic concepts: health and status 
If we were able to treat “health” like “wealth” then a person's health could be taken as 
a continuous variable that is, in itself, an objectively measurable and observable measure of 
a person's status. For a broadly-defined interpretation of health this is unrealistic. One could 
try to use proxies – since the contribution of Idler and Benyamini (1997), categorical self-
assessed measures of health are taken as acceptable proxies for individuals – but perception 
and observation might not necessarily match (Sen 2002). One could also focus on the 
inequality of individual components or aspects of health that can be objectively measured 
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(just as particular components of wealth or income are interesting subjects of inequality 
analysis), but this is necessarily of limited interest and applicability. 
 
Since there is no standard off-the-shelf measure of health status that is going to be 
generally suitable for inequality analysis, we need to be clear about two steps: (1) how to 
model health ℎ𝑖for each individual 𝑖 = 1 and, (2) given {1}, how to model the 
status variable 𝑠𝑖 that is to be used in inequality computation. 
 
2.1.1 Individual health, 𝒉𝒊
Given the difficulties in observing a broadly defined indicator of individual ℎ𝑖there are 
two main ways forward. First one might try to estimate a health production function assuming 
the following kind of relationship: 
 
= © (X) +     (1) 
 
where © is the production function, X represents a vector of determinants of health (such as 
income, demographics, institutions) and  a random component. Depending on the nature of 
the assumed specification of ©, 𝒉𝒊 could be a continuous or discrete variable. Specifying and 
estimating such a function is challenging because health status is a latent variable that cannot 
be observed. 
 
The second approach is to model 𝒉𝒊 thus: 
 
ℎ𝑖 2 f𝑐′, 𝑐′′, 𝑐′′′,g      (2) 
 
where 𝑐′, 𝑐′′, 𝑐′′′ represent different health categories. Many national and international 
surveys contain information on measures of SAH in categorical form; the categories may or 
may not have a natural ordering.  
 
So, in principle, an individual's health ℎ𝑖 can take the form of a censored variable, an 
interval variable, or an ordered categorical variable, depending on the underlying 
assumptions about how to conceptualise it and model it.  
 
2.1.2 Individual status, 𝒔𝒊
How one models an individual's status depends in part on the way ℎ𝑖 is modelled. If 
one follows the production-function approach, it might be possible to use the ℎ𝑖 value as an 
indicator of health status, just as it pops out of equation (1), or a transformation of it. If one is 
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using a specification such as that of equation (2) then a number of problems immediately 
present themselves: how to order the members of the set {𝑐′, 𝑐′′, 𝑐′′′, …} how to calibrate the 
“distance” between members of the set of categories and so on. One might, alternatively, 
incorporate in the concept of status information about health and some other personal 
characteristic, such as income. 
 
Whether one starts with equation (1) or (2), or perhaps something else, the analysis 
involves three main components: (1) extraction of suitable categorical variables on which to 
construct health and status indices; (2) computation of cardinal imputations, status measures 
and associated inequality indices and rankings; (3) an analysis of cross-country inequality 
comparisons. These three things are addressed in the following subsections. 
 
2.2 Concentration curves and indices 
The concentration curve and concentration indices (Costa-Font and Hernández-
Quevedo 2012, Koolman and van Doorslaer 2004) form arguably the most popular approach 
in the health-inequality literature. At the core of this approach is the idea that a person's status 
should be based not only on health but also on other personal or social information, as 
discussed in section 2.1: this supplementary information is personal income or other similar 
indicators that are believed to co-vary with health. Individual status is usually taken to mean 
a person's position in the income hierarchy,2 but the use of income-rank as a status variable 
is a matter of choice (why not consumption or wealth?) and its use can be problematic insofar 
as income is measured with limited precision. However, pursuing this approach makes it 
difficult to identify whether policies really affect health inequality, or simply affect determinants 
of health such as the distribution of material conditions (which in turn give rise to a fairer 
distribution of health status). Furthermore the approach can appear ad hoc rather than 
rigorously founded on economic theory.3  
 
Studies that use income as a measure of social hierarchy on self-assessed measures 
of health are problematic, in several ways. First, they tend to underestimate income-related 
inequalities in health (Dowd and Todd 2011). Second, the distribution should perhaps be 
adjusted to eliminate factors such as age or gender which could be considered to distort the 
picture of inequality. Third, even if such adjustments are successfully made, the approach 
typically ignores the contribution of essentially “avoidable” determinants of health, or even 
potentially “ethically legitimate” differences in health resulting from preventive effort and 
choice (Le Grand 1987). 
                                                          
2 See, for example, Marmot (2005), Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (2000). This was the position adopted in the 
early literature, with few exceptions (such as Le Grand 1987); recent research has argued that socioeconomic 
background is only one dimension of health inequality. 
3 An attempt has been made to justify the approach on the basis of the principle of income-related health 
transfers (Bleichrodt and van Doorslaer 2006, Fleurbaey 2006, Fleurbaey and Schokkaert 2012, page 1012), 
the plausibility of which is questionable. 
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2.3 Inequality of cardinal indicators 
 An alternative approach is to apply conventional inequality tools to specific cardinal 
indicators of health such as life expectancy, or measures of hypertension. Some of the socio-
economic differences in health might not be pure socio-economic inequalities, but may be 
determined by lifestyles (Fleurbaey and Schokkaert 2009, 2012). Other inequalities, such as 
those resulting from poor health production in younger ages, or biologically driven gender 
differences in health, are, arguably, not avoidable (Wagstaff et al. 1991). Should one attempt 
to remove all avoidable components from the analysis and focus solely on the remaining 
health inequalities? To do so makes an implicit claim of what is an illegitimate inequality, an 
approach that might seem to be tendentious. Instead one might adopt a value-free choice. 
 
The further difficulty with the cardinal-indicators approach is that some of the most 
important indicators of health status are categorical variables that do not have a natural 
cardinalisation. Clearly one could try to circumvent this by imputing some artificial index of 
individual health status as a function of the categories (Fonseca and Jones 2003). For 
example, in some cases the imputation is achieved through subjective evaluation by 
individuals (for example on a Likert scale) and in some cases by making use of quality of 
life indices (for example, EuroQuol-EQ5).4 There are various types of cardinalisation 
methods that have been proposed in the literature such as imputation of quality of life 
scales (for example, values from Visual Analogue Scales), interval regression and so on, 
but there is insufficient discussion of the economic rationale for these methods or the 
practical implications of using one method rather than another and it has been shown that 
cardinalisation can be an important source of bias.5 As a consequence, one should treat 
some of the existing literature with some caution.6 A more promising approach involves a 
proposed cardinalisation of SAH status using an imputation of the values of Health-Related 
Quality of Life (HRQoL): one obtains the value of the cut-off point of each response to the 
ordinal question in order to estimate the determinants of SAH using an interval-regression 
approach (assuming income-related health inequality – Fonseca and Jones 2003, Van 
                                                          
4 The same procedure can be applied to entities that do not have a natural ordering, such as vectors of attributes 
or endowments; one uses a utility function to force an ordering of the data. This is similar to one of the standard 
theoretical approaches to the measurement of multidimensional inequality; one computes the “utility” of factors 
and then computes inequality of utility, where the utility function is an appropriate aggregator (Maasoumi 1986, 
Tsui 1995). However the approach faces serious objections such as the arbitrariness of the cardinalisation and 
of aggregation. Even if the resulting well-being index appears reasonable over a wide subset of categories one 
might still be concerned about the way extreme values are represented in the index and their consequences for 
inequality comparisons. 
5 In a paper running a meta-regression of health inequality studies in the economics literature Costa-Font and 
Hernández-Quevedo (2013) find that the main reason for estimate heterogeneity is the way studies cardinalise 
health status. 
6 Some of the empirical attempts to examine such problems are in Costa-Font and Cowell (2013) where they 
use World Health Survey data to examine alternative pragmatic methods for measuring health-inequality and 
examining regional and country patterns of inequality orderings. 
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Doorslaer and Jones 2003). Let us consider further the underlying distribution-based 
concept as a basis for the evaluation of status. 
 
2.4 Alternative approaches using categorical data 
Here we consider approaches that use categorical data directly, without trying to 
impose a priori a particular cardinalisation. The theoretical literature on the problem of 
making inequality comparisons when the underlying equalisand is ordinal has mainly 
resulted in a number of rather limited propositions that are difficult to interpret or apply.7 
However, recent work on the analysis of distributions of categorical variables has shown 
how natural interpretations of individual status can be used to provide a robust approach to 
the inequality-measurement problem in this context without resort to arbitrary 
cardinalisation of ordinal concepts (Cowell and Flachaire 2014). The status concept is 
similar to concepts used in poverty and relative deprivation and in recent approaches to the 
inequality of opportunity (de Barros et al. 2008).  
 
Status interpreted as an individual's position in the health distribution is important in 
understanding several relationships in the economics of health. For example Costa-Font 
and Costa-Font (2009) and Hausman et al. (2002) show that effect of income on SAH 
depends in part on the individual's position in the health distribution: this finding is 
potentially important in understanding the persistence of health inequalities over time, and 
more specifically suggest that their effect depends on individual position within a given 
health distribution. In the present context the status approach gives rise to an alternative 
way of making inequality comparisons; it also gives rise to a set of inequality indices that 
incorporate conventional distributional views such as degree of inequality aversion and that 
can be applied to commonly-used measures of individual well-being. 
 
The Cowell and Flachaire (2014) approach tackles the problem by separating out 
carefully the two tricky components of inequality measurement mentioned in the introduction, 
the equalisand and the aggregation method. Each of these is underpinned by an axiomatic 
argument that goes based on first principles. The resulting Cowell and Flachaire method 
amounts to an aggregation of the discrepancies between each person's actual status and 
some status reference point. In such an approach clearly a lot rests on the precise definition 
of status. In the case of applications where the equalisand has a natural cardinalisation 
(income or wealth for example) then it makes sense to define status as just income or wealth. 
However, where only ordinal information is available – as with categorical data on health 
                                                          
7 It involves a reworking of traditional inequality-ranking approaches focusing on first-order dominance criteria 
(Abul Naga and Yalcin 2008, Allison and Foster 2004, Zheng 2011). It is commonly suggested that the median 
could be used as an equality concept corresponding to the use of the mean in conventional inequality analysis, 
although it has been noted that comparing distributions with different medians raises special issues (Abul Naga 
and Yalcin 2010). But the approach runs into difficulty if quantiles are not well-defined, as may happen in the 
case of categorical variables – see Cowell and Flachaire (2014). 
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status – then we have to do more. Suppose that information is purely categorical, in that we 
only know how many people are in each category 𝑘 = 1, 2, … 𝐾, but that the categories can 
be arranged in increasing order of their desirability. Then a simple argument shows that, if 
there are 𝑛𝑘persons in category 𝑘 = 1, 2, 3, … 𝐾, the status of person who is currently in 
category 𝑘(𝑖) must be a function of either ∑ 𝑛
𝑘(𝑖)
ℓ=1 ℓ  or ∑ 𝑛
𝐾
ℓ=𝑘(𝑖) ℓ. The first of these is a “downward 
looking” concept and the second is its “upward looking” counterpart. It may be appropriate to 
normalise by the size of the total population :=∑ 𝑛𝐾1 k so that person 's status is given by 
either the downward-looking version 
 
                                                 (3) 
 
 
or by the “upward-looking” counterpart of (3): 
 
 
                                                                  (4) 
 
 
On either definition status must lie between zero and one. If there were perfect equality 
(everyone in the same category) then it is clear that both (3) and (4) take the value 1. It turns 
out that this, the maximum-status value, is the only thing that makes sense as the reference 
point.  
 
The inequality-measurement problem then amounts to aggregating the information in 
the vector 𝑠 := (𝑠1,𝑠2, …, 𝑠𝑛) in relation to the equality vector (1, 1, …, 1). On the basis of a 
small number of elementary axioms Cowell and Flachaire show that inequality must take the 
form of an index in the following family, indexed by α: 
 
  
 
            (5) 
 
 
where α1 is a parameter indicating the desired sensitivity of the index to a particular part 
of the income distribution: for low values of αthe index α(s) is particularly sensitive to values 
of 𝑠𝑖close to zero. If 𝑠 is given by (3) (= 1) then we have an index of ordinal inequality 
based on downward-looking status; if we replace 𝑠 with 𝑠′ given by (4) then we have ordinal 
inequality defined on the corresponding upward-looking status concept. 
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So we have a family of indices that are suitable for making comparisons of inequality 
in terms of health status. In addition, members of the family can be adjusted by different 
health-inequality aversion parameters in a flexible way as other inequality indices. In what 
follows we shall suggest a way of using this to make health-inequality comparisons 
internationally. 
 
Clearly, equation (5) has a form similar to the well-known Generalised Entropy class 
of inequality indices (Cowell 1980, Shorrocks 1980). 
 
 
 
    (6) 
 
 
where µ(s) is the mean of the vector s. Whereas 𝐼𝛼(𝑠) has the reference point 1 the GE index 
𝐺𝛼(𝑠) has the reference point µ(s) and, obviously, this only makes sense where status is 
cardinal, in other words, if status defined in such a way that it is meaningful to add the status 
values together. With ordinal data one could impose an arbitrary cardinalisation and, in 
section 4 we will try out the performance of 𝐺𝛼(𝑠) for two such arbitrary cardinalisations and 
compare them with the theoretically appropriate 𝐼𝛼(𝑠). 
 
3. Data and Methods 
3.1 Data 
In view of these points it is clear that the underlying data and the health status indicator 
derived from it could be of the following forms: 
 
Continuous, censored.  In some circumstances, health status can be measured using a 
censored continuous variable (for example when visual analogue scales are employed). 
However, there are still problems related to focal responses so that certain points in a scale 
are more common than others (De Boer et al. 2004).  
 
Ordinal.  Given the categorical nature of SAH, it may be reasonable to take the ordering of 
question responses as naturally given and to employ techniques designed for ordered 
variables. For example, an ordered probit model, could be used capture the degree of 
intensity of health or ill health, without explicitly cardinalising the health concept. 
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Our approach requires quantitative analysis of internationally comparable data that 
contain measures of health status. Accordingly the main data source to be used is the World 
Health Survey which contains data from seventy countries; it collects comparable 
multidimensional micro-data on income, employment education and health. There are two 
reasons for the choice of this data base: first, its great advantage for comparative work; 
second, its standardised world-wide structure can assist in examining cross country patterns 
across heterogeneous world regions that exhibits different levels of economic and social 
development. 
 
The World Health Survey (WHS) is a general population survey, developed by WHO 
to address the need for reliable information and to cater to the increased attention to the role 
of health in economic and human development. Other alternative options (ISSP, Gallup etc) 
were not as rich in terms of controls and measurement. Indeed, the survey contains data 
from randomly selected adults (i.e. older than 18 years of age) who reside in seventy-one 
countries who implemented household face-to-face surveys, computer assisted telephone 
interview, or computer-assisted personal interview in 2002. Sample sizes range from 1,000 
to 10,000.  
 
Our measure of health status is the standard easier pf SAH status widely used in the 
literature; this is a categorical measure of health is based on the responses to the question 
“how would you rate your health today?” and yields a personal evaluation of overall health 
with potential responses in five categories ranging from “very good” to “very bad”.8 As a 
measure, it suffers from cultural adaptation problems that make cross-country comparison 
challenging, but it appears to be an adequate measure for computing within-country 
inequalities. 
 
3.2 Cardinalisation 
For categorical data a simple way to process the data is to rank the values underlying 
the latent variable health. But the “distance” between categories is unknown and an arbitrary 
scale may not be informative; there is no theoretically sound consensus strategy to measure 
such a latent variable from categorical responses. 
 
3.2.1 “Natural” cardinalisation? 
In some cases it is possible to employ existing quality-of-life measures of health status 
that are available in health surveys to impute a cardinal value to the categorical responses to 
the SAH questions, for example the imputation of values from the Health-Related Quality of 
Life scales as in Van Doorslaer and Jones (2003), Fonseca and Jones (2003). 
 
                                                          
8 The detailed values are given in Table 5 in the Appendix 
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Another way forward is to obtain a linear index based on scaling the ordered variable 
to obtain a normalised health index (Cutler and Richardson 1997). However, this still requires 
arbitrary assumptions on the value and distribution of a person's health status. Makdissi and 
Yazbeck (2014) address the question of the categorical measurement of health variables by 
using a ratio-scale transformation that modifies the information provided and focuses on the 
‘breadth’ rather than the ‘depth’ of the health-indicator information. However, they lose some 
important information on the distribution of the health variable and they focus on income-
related health inequalities which involves important and questionable assumptions. 
 
So, instead, some papers interpret SAH status as an individual's categorisation into 
an interval, which can be ascertained by finding a link between self-assessed measures of 
health and some health utility indices. For example, Van Doorslaer and Jones (2003) use the 
equivalent cardinal value of the cut-off point of each response to the ordinal question was 
obtained so as to estimate the cardinal value of SAH using an interval-regression approach. 
 
3.2.2 Regression approach 
Both ordered and interval regressions models can be used to transform a categorical 
outcome into a continuous variable based on the parameters of the regression. So, if the 
health variable allows an unambiguous ordering, then a logit or probit regression model will 
take into account the structure of the data.9 By assuming an order the probability of 
respondents' classifying themselves on a specific scale can modelled in the standard fashion. 
However, even where this is an improvement with respect to binary measures of health for 
the purposes of measuring health inequality, it is still difficult to interpret the meaning of a 
change in the order between scales of SAH status. 
 
However, the transformation is dependent in the covariates of the regression and on 
the arbitrary nature of different variable categories. The strategy we pursue here addresses 
this latter point and provides an alternative cardinalisation method, that we argue is more 
suitable to measure inequalities in health. 
 
3.2.3 Pure health inequality? 
Instead of trying to use the structure of the data to produce a cardinalisation of health 
status, Allison and Foster (2004) develop a stochastic dominance approach to 'pure health 
inequalities', which is not limited by the extent of assumptions implicit in partial inequality 
measurements of income-related health inequality. However, the range of results that are 
available from this approach is rather narrow and so it is likely to be limited.  
 
                                                          
9 See for example the logistic regression technique used by Kunst and Mackenbach (1994). 
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In this paper we use the Cowell and Flachaire (2014) methodology discussed in 
section 2.4 to undertake international comparisons of inequality of SAH status. 
 
3.3 Inequality comparisons 
Our approach in this paper is to measure the inequality of SAH status using the WHS 
international data set and the robust Cowell and Flachaire (2014) approach that takes 
account of the categorical nature of the data and the problems of making comparisons 
between countries. This involves the following steps: 
 
1. We estimate self-assessed health inequality using the Cowell and Flachaire (2014) 
class of measures for several values of the sensitivity parameter α ranging from -2 
(effectively negative infinity) to -0.99 (arbitrarily close to upper bound of α). We do 
this for both downward-looking status s and upward-looking status 𝑠′. 
 
2. We compare these measures of health inequality with those that would emerge 
from conventional inequalities using an arbitrary cardinalisation. In fact we take two 
different such cardinalisations. The first simply numbers the five health categories 
from low to high as (1,...,5) so that, if there are (𝑛1 , … , 𝑛5) observations in each of 
the categories, the status vector is given by: 
 
 
(7) 
 
 
 
To capture the idea of inequality of ill health we also look at the “inverse” case 
where the same five health categories are labelled (5,…,1).10 
 
     
(8) 
 
 
 
We then compute 𝐺α(𝑠
↑) and 𝐺α(𝑠
↓), using the same values of 𝛼 as for the ordinal 
inequality statistics computed in step 1. 
 
3. We use rank-correlation analysis to examine the association of country inequality 
orderings under the alternative definitions of status (3), (4), (7) and (8) for different 
                                                          
10 The different status measures here address the so-called: 'mirror problem' discussed by Clarke et al. (2002) 
who find that concentration indexes for SAH show inconsistent results when 'health' or 'ill-health' is as a 
dependent variable. 
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values of the inequality sensitivity parameter. In other words we look at the 
correlations between pairs from {𝐼𝛼(𝑠), 𝐼𝛼}(𝑠
′), 𝐺𝛼(𝑠
↑), 𝐺𝛼(𝑠
↓)} for a number of 
values of α. 
 
4. We regress 𝐼𝛼(𝑠) (downward) and 𝐼𝛼(𝑠
′) (upward) on a number of explanatory 
variables in order to get some insight on the factors associated with high health 
inequality. Focusing on inequality avoids problems that may arise from systematic 
response bias between countries.11 We carry out a similar analysis using the 
simple cardinalisation 𝐺α(𝑠
↑) and the inverse cardinalisation 𝐺α(𝑠
↓). 
 
5. Furthermore we examine possible patterns of health inequality by looking at the 
way in which (i) 𝐼𝛼(𝑠) for each country varies and (ii) the way country orderings 
change as the parameter α varies. 
 
3.4 Inequality regression Analysis 
What factors underlie the SAH-inequality rankings for different specifications of status 
variable? We can use standard regression analysis to address this question, assuming a 
linear relationship for the variables that may potentially influence health inequalities by 
country. Given the small number of observations we limit the number of variables to avoid 
running into limited degrees of freedom. Our dependent variable is a country-specific 
inequality index 𝐼α, 𝐺α for each country and our independent variables are the country-
specific income (𝑌𝑖), median SAH (𝐻𝑖),
12
 indicators of institutional performance (such as rule 
of law, corruption, government effectiveness, democracy), 𝑍𝑖 and a number of controls for 
country-specific characteristics (such as the proportion of old age population, female 
population ratio), 𝑋𝑖. The estimated equation is as follows: 
 
{𝐼α𝐺α} = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑌𝑖 + 𝛾2𝐻𝑖 + 𝛾3𝑋𝑖 + 𝛾4𝑍𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖 
 
where 𝑒𝑖 is a random error. We hypothesize whether the four measures of inequality are 
driven by the same country-specific determinants. Namely, would an improvement in 
government effectiveness or income reduce health inequalities? Would it do so in the same 
way irrespective of the measure of inequality or the value of 𝛼? Is there a non-linear effect of 
income (Kuznets curve) on income or health? Are changes in the composition of the 
                                                          
11 Comparing median categories across countries is regarded as uninformative given that some countries 
habitually over-report. The term “moderate health” means different things across countries because people's 
expectations are different. Some progress has been made in using anchoring vignettes that is increasingly 
used to correct for this type of bias see Kapteyn et al. (2007) and Rice et al. (2012). 
12 The variables (𝑌𝑖)and (𝐻𝑖)allow for the possibility of there being a Kuznets curve in income or in health. 
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countries’ population driving the changes in health inequality? The following section reports 
the specific variables in the regression analysis. 
 
4.  Results 
Table 1 provides the summary statistics for 70 country-level observations, organised 
as follows: 
 
Dependent variables:  Ordinal inequality indices.  The first eight rows give the sample 
statistics of 𝐼𝛼(∙), the Cowell-Flachaire (2014) for inequality of SAH, for both downward-
looking status s and upward-looking status s′. This is for 𝛼 ∈ {−2, −1, 0, 0.99}. 
 
Dependent variables:  Cardinal inequality indices.  The next eight rows give the sample 
statistics of 𝐺𝜶(∙), the Generalised Entropy inequality index using the simple cardinalisation 
of SAH s↑, and the inverse cardinalisation 𝑠↓. Again, this is for 𝛼 ∈ {−2, −1, 0, 0.99}. 
 
Independent variables.  From the literature we might expect the following to have an effect 
on health inequality:  
 
 Income levels defined as GDP per capita at the country level; 
 the median category of health status: may help to disentangle a potential Kuznets 
curve effect; 
 the proportion of females (fempop_2005) and the proportion of the elderly 
(pop65_2005) in each country: one might expect that health inequality is higher 
where there are more elderly;  
 six measures of institutional characteristics produced by the World Bank 
(corrupt_2005, rule_2005, reg_2005, goveff__2005, voiceacc_2005, ope_2005): 
one might expect lower quality to increase inequality, the intuition being that the 
less efficient the state is for general purposes, the worse it will be at channelling 
funds to reduce inequalities; 
 regional dummies. 
 
 
Visual and Graphical Analysis  
To illustrate whether the different status concepts produce different results in terms of 
inequality rankings Figure 1 shows the geographical distribution of inequality for the four 
concepts of status (downward-looking ordinal s upward-looking ordinal s′, simple cardinal s↑, 
inverse cardinal 𝑠↑). It employs a central value of the sensitivity parameter, 𝛼 = 0. It is 
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immediately clear that the different status concepts reveal quite different inequality patterns: 
see, for example, the switch between the relative position of India and Russia in inequality 
rankings as one switches from downward-looking status s to upward-looking status s′. Figure 
2 shows how the distribution of inequality changes with the sensitivity parameter. It is evident 
that changing the value of α changes the inequality ranking of the countries, but with no clear 
patterns: although Russia's inequality ranking continually increases with 𝛼, India achieves 
the highest inequality ranking at 𝛼 =  0, and Brazil at 𝛼 = −1. 
 
 
Correlation Analysis 
An obvious way to check for the overall effect of different status concepts on 
comparisons of SAH inequality is to examine the extent to which different status concepts 
produce similar inequality orderings across the 70 countries in the sample. This can be done 
by computing correlation coefficients for inequality estimates for each possible pair of status 
concepts; the estimates are, of course, contingent on a particular value of the sensitivity 
parameter 𝛼. Table 2 provides the Spearman correlation coefficients for inequality rankings 
using pairwise comparisons of the four different status concepts; this is done separately for 
each of the following cases 𝛼 =  −2, 0, 0.99. We find that for low levels of the sensitivity index 
(𝛼 =  −2) the upward-looking status inequality rankings 𝐼𝛼(s
′) correlates negatively with 
𝐺𝛼(s
↑) but positively with 𝐺𝛼(s
↓) (the Generalised Entropy inequality index using, 
respectively, the simple cardinalisation and the inverse cardinalisation of SAH); but there is 
no significant correlation of 𝐼𝛼(s
′)with 𝐼𝛼(s). Consistently, the ranking using the downward-
looking status concept 𝐼𝛼(s) is negatively correlated with 𝐺𝛼(s
↓). The negative correlations of 
(𝐼𝛼(s
′), 𝐺𝛼(𝑠
↑)) and of (𝐼𝛼(s), 𝐺𝛼(𝑠
↑)) become larger when 𝛼 =  −1. By contrast, when 
inequality is evaluated at 𝛼 =  0.99, there is a positive correlation between each pairwise 
combination of inequality orderings: only in this extreme case do we find evidence of a similar 
pattern of inequality across countries, whatever the status concept. 
 
 
Results from Regression Analysis 
Now let us examine the apparent role of income, overall health level, social institutions 
performance and country characteristics in explaining the pattern of health inequalities for the 
different health- status concepts. In Table 3 we find some evidence that GDP, government 
effectiveness and the share of female in the population increase health inequalities when a 
downward-looking ordinal health-status concept is used and the distributional sensitivity 
parameter is “bottom-sensitive” (𝛼 =  −2 and 𝛼 =  −1). However, such coefficients reverse 
sign when 𝛼 takes values of 0 and 0.99. We find for 𝛼 =  −1 some evidence of reduction of 
inequalities after a certain level of health. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Definition Mean Std. Err. 
Ordinal inequality indices 
down_i2 𝐼_2(s) 34.475 7.292884 
down_i1 𝐼_1(s) 1.184714 `0.017345 
down_i0 𝐼_0(s) 0.601429 0.004337 
down_i099 𝐼_0.99(s) 34.00371 0.237403 
up_i2 𝐼_2(s
′) 1.123429 0.10497 
up_i1 𝐼_1(s
′) 0.533857 0.016055 
up_i0 𝐼0(s
′) 0.530571 0.005766 
up_i099 𝐼0.99(s
′) 33.984 0.237727 
Cardinal inequality indices 
g2 𝐺_2(s
↑) 0.059505 0.0031 
g1 𝐺_1(s
↑) 0.044311 0.002068 
g0 𝐺0(s
↑) 0.036522 0.00158 
g099 𝐺0.99(s
↑) 0.032383 0.001356 
gI2 𝐺−2(s
↓) 0.127 0.0031 
gI1 𝐺−1(s
↓) 0.1018 0.0026 
gI0 𝐺0(s
↓) 0.0881 0.0024 
gI099 𝐺0.99(s
↓) 0.0821 0.0024 
Independent variables 
gdp_pc2005 Gross Domestic Product 1 4037.18 379.64 
median_cat~y Median Health Status 2.1286 0.009348 
fempop_2005 % Female population 50.506 0.06265 
pop65_2005 % population over 65 9.076714 0.143807 
corrupt_2005 Control of Corruption 0.1261 0.02663 
rule_2005 Rule of Law 0.102714 0.025796 
reg_2005 Regulatory Quality 0.169857 0.024874 
goveff_2005 Government effectiveness 0.196143 0.026391 
voiceacc_2005 Voice and Accountability 0.129143 0.02603 
ope_2005 Openness 77.2271 0.51429 
east_asia_~c East Asia Region 0.1 0.007479 
europe_cen~a Europe and Central Asia 0.414286 0.012281 
latin_amer~n Latin-American region 0.1 0.007479 
middle_eas~a Middle Eastern Region 0.057143 0.005787 
south_asia South Asian Region 0.071429 0.006421 
subsaharan~a Sub Saharan Africa 0.2571429 0.0108959 
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Figure 1: Country distribution of inequality: four different status concepts (𝜶 = 𝟎) 
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Figure 2: Sensitivity of country distribution of inequality to 𝜶: downward looking 
status 
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Table 2: Pairwise correlation for inequality using different status concepts  
  
α =  −2 
  
α =  −1 
 𝐼_2(s) 𝐼_2(s
′)  𝐼_1(s) 𝐼_1(s
′) 
𝐼_2(s) 1 -0.1274 𝐼_1(s) 1 -0.8385* 
𝐺_2(s
↑) 0.2841 -0.4419* 𝐺_1(s
↑) 0.4785* -0.8582* 
𝐺−2(s
↓) -0.5893* 0.3056* 𝐺−1(s
↓) -0.6283* 0.1543 
      
 α =  0  α =  0.99 
 𝐼0(s) 𝐼0(s
′)  𝐼0.99(s) 𝐼0.99(s
′) 
𝐼0(s) 1 0.363* 𝐼0.99(s) 1 0.7395* 
𝐺0(s
↑) 0.7695 0.6389* G0.99(𝑠
↑) 0.7972* 0.798* 
𝐺0(s
↓) -0.2605* 0.7389* G0.99(𝑠
↓) 0.3202* 0.3286* 
      
Note: * significant at the 5% level. 
 
 
 
In contrast to the previous tables we find now more extended evidence in Table 4 that 
except for values of α close to 0.99, median health correlated with health inequalities. Now 
we find that regulation positively correlates with higher inequality at low levels of 𝛼 (−2, −1) 
but it is not significant otherwise. Consistently with previous result, government effectiveness 
is associated with less inequalities at values of 𝛼 close to 0.99. As before, for values of 𝛼 of 
0.99 we find that female share and GDP reduced health inequalities. 
 
When we use the GE measure using the simple cardinalisation in Table 5 we find that, 
irrespective of 𝛼, median income increases inequality which is a finding we only found for up-
status inequality when 𝛼 was -1. Now, government effectiveness, reduced inequalities in all 
values of 𝛼. Overall R2 values are large given the small number of observations. Interestingly, 
when we examine the determinants of GE on the “inverse” cardinalisation (Table 6) we find 
that median health reduces health inequality on a similar magnitude irrespective of 𝛼 with 
values ranging from 0.01 to 0.023 suggesting that doubling health status would reduce 
inequality by between 1 and 2.3%. 
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Table 3: Determinants of Inequality Down (OLS) 
 
VARIABLES 
 
(1) 
down_i2 
(2) 
down_i1 
(3) 
down_i0 
(4) 
down_i099 
median_category -26.45 
(19.47) 
-0.251*** 
(0.0359) 
-0.0029 
(0.0127) 
0.916 
(0.658) 
gdp_pc2005_01 0.00185* 
(0.00103) 
3.37e-06* 
(1.89e-06) 
-1.06e-06 
(6.72e-07) 
-7.19e-05** 
(3.47e-05) 
fempop_2005 8.458*** 
(4.193) 
0.0178** 
(0.00772) 
-0.00539* 
(0.00274) 
-0.296** 
(0.142) 
pop65_2005 1.493 
(2.552) 
-0.0064 
(0.00470) 
0.0003 
(0.00167) 
0.0217 
(0.0862) 
ope_2005 -0.433 
(0.411) 
-0.0007 
(0.000756) 
0.00035 
(0.000268) 
0.0321** 
(0.0139) 
voiceacc_2005 -12.87 
(17.91) 
-0.0042 
(0.0330) 
0.0119 
(0.0117) 
0.334 
(0.605) 
polstab_2005 11.32 
(11.56) 
-0.0102 
(0.0213) 
-0.0055 
(0.00756) 
-0.0742 
(0.391) 
goveff_2005 91.47** 
(35.30) 
0.165** 
(0.0650) 
-0.0470** 
(0.0231) 
-2.647** 
(1.193) 
reg_2005 -125.1*** 
(32.18) 
-0.133** 
(0.0593) 
0.0127 
(0.0210) 
1.285 
(1.088) 
rule_2005 -16.77 
(31.30) 
-0.0237 
(0.0576) 
0.0276 
(0.0205) 
0.499 
(1.058) 
corrupt_2005 11.74 
(26.68) 
-0.0077 
(0.0491) 
0.00363 
(0.0174) 
0.832 
(0.902) 
healthexp_2005 -8.392 
(5.933) 
-0.0067 
(0.0109) 
0.00635 
(0.00388) 
0.328 
(0.200) 
Constant -278.4 
(219.8) 
 
0.924** 
(0.405) 
0.824*** 
(0.144) 
43.20*** 
(7.427) 
Observations 69 69 69 69 
R-squared 0.391 0.634 0.262 0.336 
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p,0.01, ** p,0.05, * p,0.1  
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Table 4: Determinants of Inequality Up (OLS) 
 
VARIABLES 
 
(1) 
up_i2 
(2) 
up_i1 
(3) 
up_i0 
(4) 
up_i099 
median_category 1.605*** 
(0.180) 
0.231*** 
(0.0313) 
0.0570*** 
(0.0140) 
0.934 
(0.658) 
gdp_pc2005_01 -4.73e-06 
(9.49e-06) 
-2.00e-06 
(1.66e-06) 
-1.50e-06** 
(7.41e-07) 
-7.22e-05** 
(3.47e-05) 
fempop_2005 -0.0722* 
(0.0387) 
-0.0107 
(0.00675) 
-0.00609** 
(0.00302) 
-0.296** 
(0.142) 
pop65_2005 0.0402* 
(0.0236) 
0.00636 
(0.00411) 
0.00209 
(0.00184) 
0.0225 
(0.0862) 
ope_2005 -0.00131 
(0.00379) 
0.000593 
(0.000661) 
0.000652** 
(0.000296) 
0.0323** 
(0.0139) 
voiceacc_2005 -0.108 
(0.165) 
-0.0151 
(0.0289) 
0.00132 
(0.0129) 
0.331 
(0.605) 
polstab_2005 0.178 
(0.107) 
0.0225 
(0.0186) 
0.00393 
(0.00833) 
-0.0694 
(0.391) 
goveff_2005 -0.613* 
(0.326) 
-0.0801 
(0.0569) 
-0.0440* 
(0.0254) 
-2.639** 
(1.193) 
reg_2005 0.887*** 
(0.297) 
0.119*** 
(0.0518) 
0.0365 
(0.0232) 
1.292 
(1.088) 
rule_2005 0.0200 
(0.289) 
-0.0338 
(0.0504) 
-0.0146 
(0.0226) 
0.476 
(1.058) 
corrupt_2005 -0.224 
(0.246) 
0.00430 
(0.0430) 
0.0218 
(0.0192) 
0.842 
(0.902) 
healthexp_2005 -0.0810 
(0.0548) 
-0.00655 
(0.00955) 
0.00281 
(0.00428) 
0.327 
(0.200) 
Constant 1.697 
(2.029) 
 
0.552 
(0.354) 
 
0.650*** 
(0.158) 
43.16*** 
(7.428) 
Observations 69 69 69 69 
R-squared 0.750 0.674 0.487 0.338 
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.01 
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Table 5: Determinants of Inequality GE (OLS) 
 
VARIABLES 
 
(1) 
g_i2 
(2) 
g_i1 
(3) 
g_i0 
(4) 
g_i099 
median_category 0.0356*** 
(0.00841) 
0.244*** 
(0.00544) 
0.0188*** 
(0.00406) 
0.0162*** 
(0.00342) 
gdp_pc2005_01 -6.28e-07 
(4.44e-07) 
-4.20e-07 
(2.87e-07) 
-3.17e-07 
(2.14e-07) 
-2.65e-07 
(1.81e-07) 
fempop_2005 -0.00268 
(0.00181) 
-0.00177 
(0.00117) 
-0.00132 
(0.000874) 
-0.00108 
(0.000736) 
pop65_2005 0.000490 
(0.00110) 
0.000324 
(0.000713) 
0.000247 
(0.000532) 
0.000212 
(0.000448) 
ope_2005 4.71e-05 
(0.000177) 
4.49e-05 
(0.000115) 
4.19e-05 
(8.56e-05) 
3.90e-05 
(7.21e-05) 
voiceacc_2005 0.00258 
(0.00774) 
0.000505 
(0.00501) 
-0.000426 
(0.00374) 
-0.000986 
(0.00315) 
polstab_2005 -0.000428 
(0.00499) 
9.88e-05 
(0.00323) 
0.000320 
(0.00241) 
0.000449 
(0.00203) 
goveff_2005 -0.0305* 
(0.0152) 
-0.0225** 
(0.00987) 
-0.0183** 
(0.00736) 
-0.0163** 
(0.00620) 
reg_2005 0.00912 
(0.0139) 
0.00760 
(0.00900) 
0.00689 
(0.00671) 
0.00669 
(0.00565) 
rule_2005 0.0202 
(0.0135) 
0.0127 
(0.00875) 
0.00877 
(0.00653) 
0.00671 
(0.00550) 
corrupt_2005 -2.29e-05 
(0.0115) 
0.00199 
(0.00746) 
0.00286 
(0.00556) 
0.00336 
(0.00469) 
healthexp_2005 0.00336 
(0.00256) 
0.00218 
(0.00166) 
0.00158 
(0.00124) 
0.00128 
(0.00104) 
Constant 0.0990 
(0.0949) 
 
0.0681 
(0.0614) 
 
0.0526 
(0.0458) 
0.0437 
(0.0386) 
Observations 69 69 69 69 
R-squared 0.371 0.408 0.435 0.456 
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.01 
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Table 6: Determinants of Inequality Inverse GE (OLS) 
 
VARIABLES 
 
(1) 
g_i2 
(2) 
g_i1 
(3) 
g_i0 
(4) 
g_i099 
median_category -0.0191**  
(0.00910) 
-0.0215*** 
(0.00718) 
-0.0222*** 
(0.00645) 
-0.0233*** 
(0.00646) 
gdp_pc2005_01 -5.13e-07 
(4.80e-07) 
-2.82e-07 
(3.79e-07) 
-1.51e-07 
(3.41e-07) 
-6.48e-08 
(3.41e-07) 
fempop_2005 -0.00152 
(0.00196) 
-0.000887 
(0.00155) 
-0.000532 
(0.00139) 
-0.000311 
(0.00139) 
pop65_2005 -0.000268 
(0.00119) 
-0.000462 
(0.000941) 
-0.000582 
(0.000846) 
-0.000696 
(0.000847) 
ope_2005 0.000180 
(0.000192) 
8.82e-05 
(0.000151) 
2.99e-05 
(0.000136) 
-1.28e-05 
(0.000136) 
voiceacc_2005 0.00338 
(0.00837) 
0.00335 
(0.00661) 
0.00320 
(0.00594) 
0.00321 
(0.00594) 
polstab_2005 -0.00178 
(0.00540) 
-0.00235 
(0.00426) 
-0.00276 
(0.00383) 
-0.00323 
(0.00384) 
goveff_2005 -0.0215 
(0.0165) 
-0.0147 
(0.0130) 
-0.0119 
(0.0117) 
-0.0112 
(0.0117) 
reg_2005 -0.00317 
(0.0150) 
-0.00512 
(0.0119) 
-0.00584 
(0.0107) 
-0.00634 
(0.0107) 
rule_2005 0.00777 
(0.0146) 
0.0101 
(0.0115) 
0.0124 
(0.0104) 
0.0152 
(0.0104) 
corrupt_2005 0.0136 
(0.0125) 
0.00715 
(0.00984) 
0.00330 
(0.00884) 
0.000630 
(0.00885) 
healthexp_2005 0.00342 
(0.00277) 
0.00285 
(0.00219) 
0.00260 
(0.00197) 
0.00258 
(0.00197) 
Constant 0.219** 
(0.103) 
 
0.176** 
(0.0811) 
 
0.151** 
(0.0728) 
0.140* 
(0.0729) 
Observations 69 69 69 69 
R-squared 0.278 0.341 0.382 0.405 
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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5. Conclusion 
In the case of wealth inequality, getting better estimates is, to some extent, largely a 
function of getting better data; but in the case of health inequality, more is involved. Even if 
one has very good, carefully collected data on self-assessed health, almost always one has 
to deal with the fact that the data will be categorical in nature and require special treatment 
in order to make reliable inequality comparisons. Here we have followed the Cowell and 
Flachaire (2014) status-inequality approach that defines a family of inequality indices indexed 
by a sensitivity parameter 𝛼. The status concept could be downward or upward-looking, and 
we employ an arbitrary cardinalisation to measure results from generalised entropy indices.  
 
In this paper we find that, for low values of the sensitivity parameter 𝛼 (where the index 
is most sensitive to the bottom of the distribution) status does matter to a point that we find 
no, or even negative, correlation between up and down versions of status. In contrast, for 
zero or positive values of 𝛼 the association becomes positive and large. Similarly, when we 
compare different measures of status with the corresponding cardinal inequality index (the 
generalised entropy measure, 𝐺𝑎), using the arbitrary 1-to-5 cardinalisation, we find that for 
negative values of 𝛼 there is a negative correlation between up-status (ordinal) 𝐼𝛼 and 𝐺𝛼; 
this flips and becomes positive for 𝛼 ≥  0. We find a similar story if we use the inverse – 5-
to-1 – cardinalisation for health status; the negative correlation between 𝐼𝛼  and (cardinal) 𝐺𝛼  
that is observed for 𝛼 < 0 becomes positive for high values of the sensitivity parameter 𝛼. 
 
Regression analysis indicates a number of different determinants of inequality 
measures. Specifically, we find that median health status only increases as 𝛼 becomes close 
to unity. In that case, government effectiveness reduces health inequality. Government 
effectiveness reduces inequality if a down-status measure is employed, for positive value of 
𝛼 and the opposite applies for negative values of 𝛼. 
 
Our findings in the Appendix indicate no evidence of a Kuznets curve on health and 
on GDP, and no association with health expenditure. 
 
The paper has important policy implications. First, our findings suggest that 
government attempts to reduce health inequalities need to pay specific attention to the nature 
of the data, and they need to specify the sensitivity to inequality in different parts of the 
distribution (the parameter 𝛼) in accordance with the values of a specific society. Second, we 
find evidence of heterogeneous determinants of different inequality measures. Our results 
suggest robust evidence that health inequalities are sensitive to some measures of 
institutional performance (e.g., government effectiveness). However, these results need to 
be taken with caution given the small number of observations. 
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Appendix 
The data are taken from the World Health Organization's World Health Survey, which 
is described here: http://www.who.int/healthinfo/survey/instruments/en/index.html. In 
particular, for our categorical variable, we use the responses to one specific question in this 
survey's collection of individual questions about overall health. 
 
“Q2000: In general, how would you rate your health today? The respondent should 
answer according to how he/she considers his/her health to be and give his/her best 
estimate. Both physical and mental health must be taken into consideration.” 
 
Table 5 reports the answers to this question across 70 countries. The titles of 
Columns (1) to (5) give the categories used in the survey: we follow the natural order taking 
(1) as the best category and (5) as the worst. The total number of respondents is in column 
(6): if in any row this total exceeds the sum of columns (1) to (5), the difference is 
attributable to non-response. 
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Table 7: Responses in WHS to self-rated health question 
 
 
 
Country 
(1) 
Very good 
(2) 
Good 
(3) 
Moderate 
(4) 
Bad 
(5) 
Very Bad 
(6) 
Total 
1 Australia 487 775 446 74 11 1793 
1 Austria 423 390 200 36 4 1053 
3 Bangladesh 494 1949 2132 741 228 5544 
4 Belgium 252 487 197 48 11 995 
5 Bosnia 271 328 279 127 23 1028 
6 Brazil 715 1934 1881 348 119 4997 
7 Burkina Faso 1254 2104 1137 288 36 4819 
8 Chad 889 1767 1371 549 37 4613 
9 China 982 1485 1215 277 34 3993 
10 Comoros 312 631 523 261 30 1757 
11 Congo 693 550 693 252 33 2221 
12 Côte d’Ivoire 661 1215 955 266 21 3118 
13 Croatia 200 302 312 132 43 989 
14 Czech 160 350 311 90 19 930 
15 Denmark 320 472 166 40 4 1002 
16 Dominican 722 1806 1560 397 34 4519 
17 Ecuador 650 1945 1569 378 53 4595 
18 Estonia 70 293 499 134 16 1012 
19 Ethiopia 2138 1549 972 220 47 4926 
20 Finland 158 395 391 64 3 1011 
21 France 255 525 192 34 2 1008 
22 Georgia 265 778 1111 476 125 2755 
23 Germany 229 582 343 85 13 1252 
24 Ghana 1379 1433 830 234 46 3922 
25 Greece 347 325 246 63 19 1000 
26 Guatemala 730 1790 1747 472 24 4763 
27 Hungary 139 579 503 155 34 1410 
28 India 2159 3577 2616 1311 202 9865 
29 Ireland 366 257 101 29 5 758 
30 Israel 519 405 234 40 23 1221 
31 Italy 182 449 305 46 15 997 
32 Kazakhstan 265 1894 2088 231 18 4496 
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 …continued 
Country 
 
Very good 
 
Good 
 
Moderate 
 
Bad 
 
Very Bad 
 
Total 
33 Kenya 1115 1798 1144 309 40 4406 
34 Lao 1787 2005 906 168 17 4883 
35 Latvia 35 244 390 155 32 856 
36 Luxembourg 164 246 155 33 2 700 
37 Malawi 2855 1334 838 231 33 5291 
38 Malaysia 1194 3495 1111 204 12 6016 
39 Mali 1334 1526 895 266 11 4032 
40 Mauritania 941 1672 1024 154 9 3800 
41 Mauritius 850 1677 827 427 104 3885 
42 Mexico 7193 18112 11221 2002 218 38746 
43 Morocco 598 1454 1754 821 372 4999 
44 Myanmar 1215 3412 1100 157 2 5886 
45 Namibia 1622 1249 863 204 45 3983 
46 Nepal 1455 3908 2505 767 53 8688 
47 Netherlands 189 640 214 41 2 1086 
48 Norway 314 456 140 46 13 969 
49 Pakistan 1770 2996 1315 263 25 6369 
50 Paraguay 1700 1920 1370 133 16 5139 
51 Philippines 817 5127 3759 354 19 10076 
52 Portugal 62 342 390 180 55 1029 
53 Russia 261 1102 2192 770 91 4416 
54 Senegal 646 1028 984 217 24 2899 
55 Slovakia 400 798 506 94 17 1815 
56 Slovenia 90 238 193 53 9 583 
57 South Africa 837 865 467 129 42 2340 
58 Spain 1051 2984 1689 502 117 6343 
59 Sri Lanka 1844 3019 1535 298 22 6718 
60 Swaziland 198 451 508 676 236 2069 
61 Sweden 262 354 235 133 14 998 
62 Tunisia 1236 1850 1476 411 58 5031 
63 Turkey 1301 4909 4035 869 189 11203 
64 UAE 536 472 146 18 6 1178 
65 UK 318 498 278 82 17 1193 
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 …continued 
Country 
 
Very good 
 
Good 
 
Moderate 
 
Bad 
 
Very Bad 
 
Total 
66 Ukraine 129 659 1364 594 103 2849 
67 Uruguay 725 1632 547 63 9 2976 
68 Vietnam 398 1368 1489 225 10 3490 
69 Zambia 1436 1292 816 228 39 3811 
70 Zimbabwe 837 1263 1501 385 65 4051 
 
 
 
Table 8: Inequality and health expenditure (𝛂 =  −𝟎) 
 
VARIABLES 
(1) 
down_i0 
(2) 
up_i0 
(3) 
g0 
 
healthexp_2005 
 
0.00136 
(0.00184) 
 
-0.00388 
(0.00241) 
 
-0.000327 
(0.000671) 
Constant 0.593*** 
(0.0128) 
 
0.556*** 
(0.0167) 
0.0387*** 
(0.00466) 
Observations 70 70 70 
R-squared 0.008 0.037 0.003 
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
 
 
Table 9: Kuznets curve on GDP 
 
VARIABLES 
(1) 
down_i0 
(2) 
up_i0 
(3) 
g0 
 
gdp_pc2005 
 
-3.96e-07 
(7.40e-07) 
 
-1.03e-06 
(0.77e-07) 
 
-1.90e-07 
(2.28e-07) 
gdp2 0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
Constant 0.607*** 
 
0.541*** 0.0387*** 
Observations 70 70 70 
R-squared 0.025 0.038 0.023 
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 10: Kuznets curve on health 
 
VARIABLES 
(1) 
down_i0 
(2) 
up_i0 
(3) 
g0 
 
median_category 
 
-0.00365 
(0.0952) 
 
-0.00365 
(0.0952) 
 
-0.0216 
(0.0296) 
media2 -0.00121 
(0.0198) 
-0.00121 
(0.0198) 
0.00826 
(0.00616) 
Constant 0.615*** 
(0.111) 
 
0.615*** 
(0.111) 
0.0440*** 
(0.0347) 
Observations 70 70 70 
R-squared 0.01- 0.010 0.278 
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
